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In the unfinished final chapter of his unfinished Political Treatise we find Spinoza’s 
unfinished thought about the exclusion of women from the democratic polity. Spinoza 
says that women are deprived of citizenship in a democracy because they are ‘under 
the control of their husbands’ and, furthermore, ‘women do not naturally possess 
equal right with men’.1 The two paragraphs in which Spinoza discusses women’s 
exclusion from democratic citizenship have provoked both anger and puzzlement: 
anger because Spinoza’s reasoning here is so poor, and puzzlement because Spinoza’s 
position seems to run counter to what can be inferred from his Ethics about political 
community. The basis of human communities, as stated in the Ethics, is that we join 
together with others who ‘agree in nature’ with us. There is no indication there that 
this agreement of nature cannot include women as well as men; in fact, as we will see, 
there is evidence to the contrary. The best communities are formed on the basis of 
what we have in common, not in terms of our experiences, backgrounds, beliefs, or 
feelings, but in terms of what human beings essentially are and what we truly know. 
Our essence is to strive to preserve our being – to carry on being human beings – and 
to build the ‘common notions’ that are the basis of true knowledge of ourselves and 
nature. Common striving, common essence, and common notions bind us together to 
work for our mutual benefit regardless of our differences.2 
At first, it looks as if Spinoza’s texts follow a familiar pattern: the ‘universal’ 
claim he makes for all human beings in one text is revealed in another to be restricted 
to men. We see this pattern in Rousseau and Kant, for instance, in the shifts from their 
‘theoretical’ to their ‘practical’ texts. While their political theories can show that 
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reason, freedom, and citizenship extend to all human beings, their practical guides to 
the right workings of society state that at least half of human beings are excluded 
from attaining those goods.3 Following decades of feminist philosophical critique, it is 
now widely acknowledged that the detail of these practical texts must lead us to re-
interpret the universal claims for humanity of the theoretical texts as, in fact, claims 
for male humanity.4 This seems to me the right strategy in the cases of Rousseau and 
Kant, where the practical texts shed light on the hidden assumptions of the theoretical 
ones. However, there is no parallel distinction for Spinoza between what 
‘theoretically’ holds for all humanity, and what actually holds in practice (TP 1.1). 
We cannot distinguish the position of the Ethics from that of the Political Treatise in 
these terms. Instead, these two texts of Spinoza’s differ in their relation to truth and 
knowledge. Whereas the Ethics prompts readers to build true understanding of nature, 
the Political Treatise invites them to imagine political formations that have the status 
of ‘fictions’ that are neither true nor false. It would therefore be wrong to reinterpret 
Spinoza’s claims for humanity in the Ethics in terms of what he says about women in 
the Political Treatise. Instead, as I will show, the remarks about women in the 
Political Treatise must be interpreted in terms of the truth that Spinoza unfolds in the 
Ethics.  
The general conclusion I reach will be familiar to feminist readers of  Spinoza: 
that women, in Spinoza’s system, are deprived of freedom and political participation 
not by their essential natures, but by their social and historical circumstances. The 
originality of this paper is not in that conclusion, which I share with Genevieve Lloyd, 
but in the detail and method of my argument, which take a different trajectory from 
Lloyd’s.5 In the first section, I look at the Political Treatise and the Ethics as texts 
with different critical functions to show why we need not be puzzled or perturbed by 
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Spinoza’s remarks in the Political Treatise. I also indicate how, for Spinoza, we must 
formulate the question of women’s capabilities. In the second section, that question is 
developed through looking at the ‘natural right’ of women in comparison with others 
who are similarly not ‘free men’. In the third section, I show that women’s equal 
capacity for political participation must be grounded, for Spinoza, in the 
compositional similarity of men and women. I argue, finally, that Spinoza offers an 
explanation for women’s disempowerment through his account of marriage: as long 
as women are economically dependent on their husbands, they cannot share power 
either in the micro-community of marriage or in the political community at large. I 
aim to show that Spinoza’s remarks on women must be taken as prompts for critical 
consideration of the place of women in the progressive democratic polity. 
 
 
Truth and Fictions 
 
The Political Treatise, begun around 1675, is Spinoza’s mature work on political 
organization. It is not only less polemical than the censored and vilified Theological-
Political Treatise of 1670; it is also less concerned with the promotion of human 
freedom. Instead, its purpose is to determine how to preserve peace and harmony in 
different types of civil state. While these two purposes are not at odds (for Spinoza, 
‘security and liberty are so closely intertwined that one cannot exist without the 
other’6), the Political Treatise takes the perspective of the state becoming better 
organized rather than that of the individual becoming more free. Following several 
sections on the rights and aims of a society, Spinoza explains how best to uphold 
stability in a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy. The section on democracy, 
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intended to be the culmination of the treatise, was left unfinished when Spinoza died 
in 1677. It is in this unfinished section that the question of women arises. 
 Spinoza states that he will discuss only one type of democracy: the kind where 
voting and undertaking offices of state are exclusively the privilege of ‘those who 
owe allegiance only to their country’s laws and are in other respects in control of their 
own right and lead respectable lives’ (TP 11.3). The purpose of these restrictions 
seems to be to exclude foreigners, women, children, servants, and criminals from 
democratic participation.7 Whereas the exclusion of foreigners, children, servants, and 
criminals is not questioned, Spinoza accepts that one might reasonably question the 
exclusion of women. He asks whether is it by nature or convention that women are 
under the control of men, ‘for if this has come about simply by convention, there is no 
reason compelling us to exclude women from government’ (TP 11.4). Drawing on 
empirical examples, however, Spinoza concludes that women’s disempowerment is 
natural and ‘arises from their weakness’. 
If women were naturally the equal of men and were equally endowed 
with strength of mind and ability – qualities wherein human power and 
consequently human right consists – then surely so many and such a 
wide variety of nations would have yielded some instances where both 
sexes ruled on equal terms and other instances where men were ruled 
by women, being so brought up to be inferior in ability. But as such 
instances are nowhere to be found, one is fully entitled to assert that 
women do not naturally possess equal right with men and that they 
necessarily give way to men. (TP 11.4) 
This seems to be an example of a classic bad argument for denying women rights: if 
women were truly equal to men, then in all of human history all over the world, there 
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would be some examples of women holding power over men; since there are no such 
examples, women cannot be truly equal to men.8 What the bad argument fails to 
consider, above all, are the historical conditions that determine the distribution of 
power according to sexual difference. 
It is this point that Moira Gatens, in particular, levels at Spinoza. Moira Gatens 
and Genevieve Lloyd were among the first to critically discuss Spinoza in terms of 
contemporary feminist philosophy, and, with Susan James, remain the most important 
feminist philosophers working on Spinoza today.9 In her 1996 book Imaginary 
Bodies, Gatens notes Spinoza’s remark that if there were a society ruled by women, 
men would be ‘brought up to be inferior in ability’. That is, for women to maintain 
power over men, men would need to be conditioned through culture and education to 
neglect their abilities to act and to think, to consider themselves less active and less 
rational than women, and to internalize ideas that reinforce their inferiority. But while 
Spinoza acknowledges this, Gatens says, he fails to see ‘that this is arguably the 
historical situation of women: that is, that women have been so brought up that we 
can make less use of our abilities’ (134). A blindness to women’s historical situation 
does appear to follow from Spinoza’s denial that women’s inequality is purely 
conventional. Conventions, for Spinoza, are the cultural practices that we are trained 
to repeat by associating them with certain images and affects. They vary according to 
custom, religion, education, and upbringing (E IIIApp.XXVII). But women’s 
subjection to men’s power does not vary with culture or history, according to 
Spinoza’s brief survey. In all cultures at all times ‘we find men ruling and women’s 
being ruled and both sexes thus living in harmony’ (TP 11.4). It is not merely that 
certain cultures have associated an image of ‘women’ with an image of subjection, 
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Spinoza suggests: the difference in power between men and women is natural and 
harmonious. 
In a more recent interview, however, Gatens has suggested that Spinoza’s 
work includes the possibility for considering women as constrained by their social and 
historical conditions.10 This forms part of Gatens’ important rehabilitation of 
Spinoza’s concept of imagination for feminist thought. Women’s subjection may be 
natural and real – it is part of nature, as all power relations are – but nevertheless 
‘imaginary’. The fact that women’s subjection is found throughout human culture 
highlights the insidiousness of particular systems of images concerning sexual 
difference. Spinoza acknowledges that complex image-systems, such as those of 
religion, can overpower reason: they can be so deeply ingrained in our practices as to 
be invisible, even to the rational person, and impossible to shake off with an act of 
will. In Collective Imaginings Gatens and Lloyd use Spinoza’s concept of imagination 
to diagnose the ‘imaginings’ of individuals and cultures: the collective fictions and 
passions that determine and often constrain individuals’ capabilities. In Part of 
Nature, Lloyd suggests that Spinoza can explain the disempowerment of groups of 
individuals through his account of fictions. On this interpretation, Spinoza 
understands that women’s inferiority is not essential to their nature, but the result of 
historical and social conditions that bind (and blind) human beings to power relations 
that are imaginary, yet deeply ingrained. 
If Gatens and Lloyd are right – and I believe they are – then there is no 
essential reason for Spinoza why women should be excluded from the polity. The 
reasons do not stem from women’s essence, but from the conditions of their 
existence.11 Because of the distinction between what is true and what is real but 
imaginary, the fact that the gendered power relation is real and natural does not mean, 
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for Spinoza, that it is an absolute truth embedded in our essence as human beings. We 
need to be careful, therefore, in how we read Spinoza’s claims about women’s 
‘natural’ disempowerment. Despite appearances to the contrary, I believe that no 
claim is being made about women’s essential nature or capabilities in the Political 
Treatise. That is because the Political Treatise is not the kind of text that can make 
those claims. Spinoza does not even intend us to understand his statements about 
women as true. His remarks about women form part of a fiction, and as such, they are 
valid only insofar as they cohere with a system of images that is, as a whole, neither 
true nor false. 
For Spinoza, ‘fictions’ are more or less coherent systems of images based on 
experiences, memories, and affects which, when shared by members of a community, 
are fundamental to religion, politics, and culture. Because images are inadequate 
ideas, fictions are systems of partial and confused truths. Their connection may be 
coherent, but the fiction itself will not be a clear and distinct true idea. Yet while 
fictions are not true, nor are they strictly false, because fictions are not assented to; 
they include our awareness of their inadequacy. Fictions concern ‘possibilities’ – a 
term which must be qualified. According to Spinoza’s metaphysics, there are no 
‘possible’ things or events: all being that can exist does exist, and exists necessarily 
(E IP29, IP33S1). From God’s eternal perspective there is no ‘possibility’. However, 
we do speak of possibility from the human perspective, because we do not perfectly 
understand the necessary order and connection of events. Nor do we fully understand 
whether a set of causes is determined to produce a certain thing or not (E IVD4). 
Fictions, then, are ‘possibilities’ from a human perspective only: they amount to ideas 
whose necessity or impossibility we do not yet know. They have the status of 
hypotheses, uncertainties to be held up for scrutiny until the truth is known.12 Fictions 
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are not merely illusory, for they have real power and cause real effects, as Gatens and 
Lloyd explain: 
The imagination may create fables, fictions, or collective ‘illusions’, 
which have ‘real’ effects, that is, which serve to structure forms of 
identity, social meaning and value, but which considered in 
themselves, are neither true nor false. … Socially shared fictions play a 
constitutive role in binding a group of individuals together. (123) 
For Spinoza, political organization is always to some extent fictional, for it is a system 
of imagined rules for managing human life. That the rules are imagined does not 
make them illusory or false. These systems are coherent and powerful, but they are 
inadequate because they are based on a partial and confused understanding of human 
nature, not on perfect knowledge of what human beings essentially have in common. 
Even the best political systems are ‘possibilities’ held out for us to work with and 
scrutinize as we strive to understand ourselves better.  
The best political system is one that promotes this striving amongst the largest 
proportion of its members, so that its organization becomes progressively less 
fictional and more grounded on rational true understanding. The best state seeks to 
preserve itself, not as a static thing, but as this progressively rational and harmonious 
entity. The peace and security of the state depend on the state’s always striving for 
more reason and virtue, just as the happiness of a human being does (‘Freedom of 
spirit or strength of mind is the virtue of a private citizen: the virtue of a state is its 
security’, TP 1.6). The purpose of the Political Treatise is to show how monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy should be organized in order to maintain their being as 
thus progressing, as far as that is possible within their own systemic constraints, and 
to prevent their regression into tyranny. In other words, it is to provide us with those 
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fictions which best allow states to progress towards reason and virtue. Just as the 
Ethics promotes a model of humanity which we should follow as we work towards 
greater virtue (E IV Preface), the Political Treatise offers three models  of good 
political organization for societies to look to as they progress.13 These models are 
schemas, or fictions. The Political Treatise is entirely concerned with presenting and 
sharing organized systems of images. 
If we understand the Political Treatise in this way, we can make better sense 
of the bad argument of chapter 11. To prove that women have no natural capacity to 
hold political power, Spinoza appeals to the fact that women have never held such 
power and have always been ruled by men. This is a bad argument by any lights, but 
particularly by Spinoza’s. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows that every individual has 
unique capabilities for acting and thinking, capabilities that are specific to its body 
and mind and that are engaged to varying degrees depending on the situation. Our 
capabilities are not fixed; they develop as the body and mind are more active (E 
IIP13-14). What an individual is capable of cannot be inferred from what that 
individual has or has not done in the past, because new situations may lead new 
capabilities to be realized: ‘experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can 
do from the laws of Nature alone’ (E IIIP2S). Furthermore, an individual’s 
capabilities cannot be adduced from the supposed capabilities of ‘women’ in general, 
because ‘women’ is a universal term based on generalization from experience. 
Universals are images of images, and involve very little truth: 
Those notions they call Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the like, 
have arisen … because so many images (e.g. of men) are formed at one 
time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining – not 
entirely, of course, but still to the point where the mind can imagine 
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neither slight differences of the singular [men] (such as the colour and 
size of each one, etc.) nor their determinate number, and imagines 
distinctly only what they all agree in, insofar as they affect the body. 
For the body has been affected most [forcefully] by [what is common], 
since each singular has affected it [by this property]. And [the mind] 
expresses this by the word man, and predicates of it infinitely many 
singulars. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a determinate number 
of singulars. 
 But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by all 
[men] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance 
with what the body has more often been affected by, and what the 
mind imagines or recollects more easily. … Each will form universal 
images of things according to the disposition of his body. (E IIP40S1, 
interpolations Curley’s, ellipses mine)  
Spinoza teaches us to be wary of universals: since they cover over specific differences 
and vary according to our experiences and affects, they ‘signify ideas that are 
confused in the highest degree’ (E IIP40S1).14 Any universal statement about 
‘women’ will reflect only those qualities of women that have happened to affect the 
speaker most forcefully. Spinoza certainly knows that empirical examples of what 
people do (or do not do) in general, are no proof of what individuals are specifically 
capable of. 
If Spinoza is offering an argument for women’s natural disempowerment in 
chapter 11, it is a spectacularly bad one. However, I believe it is mistaken to think that 
Spinoza is offering an argument at all. When Spinoza says that women are subject to 
men’s power by nature, he means that women’s disempowerment is not illusory. 
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Men’s power over women is real: it is a fact, and it is observable in nature. But that 
does not mean that ‘women are subject to men’s power’ is a true idea that could be 
deduced and rationally known. In fact, Spinoza’s rhetorical strategy here indicates 
that this is not a true idea. A true idea can be adequately demonstrated, in the sense of 
being deduced from adequate understanding of its cause (E IIP32-40). If Spinoza 
were trying to argue for the truth of this idea, he would need to demonstrate how it 
follows necessarily from another true idea. Spinoza does not even attempt such a 
demonstration here. Instead, he says that the fact of men’s power over women can be 
seen in experience, and infers that this situation cannot be merely a matter of 
linguistic or cultural convention. This statement, as Spinoza would surely admit, is 
highly confused: it relies, first, on his own generalizations of ‘men’ and ‘women’ and 
whatever affects accompany those confused images, and second, on an inference, 
which is a move of the imagination. The statement is an imagined belief, not a 
rationally known truth.15 This is why Spinoza offers us empirical examples in the 
place of a good argument: that women are under the control of their husbands is his 
own empirical observation, not a true idea. Spinoza imagines, but does not know, that 
women are subject to men’s power; accordingly, his belief is supported not by 
arguments, but by stories. 
As Gatens and Lloyd say, we must ‘maintain a distinction between those 
statements, ideas or imaginings which are meaning-generating and those which are 
true or false’ (123). The statements and stories of the Political Treatise are 
meaningful and meant to cause effects, but as fictions, they are neither true nor false. 
Spinoza does not intend us to read his remarks about women as true ideas because, 
put simply, the Political Treatise does not deal in true ideas. It deals in hypotheses 
which we must critically and rationally examine before accepting them as necessary, 
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rejecting them as impossible, or continuing to entertain them as possibilities. As 
James remarks, the model of the democratic state ‘holds out an image of perfectly 
inclusive polity that is … beyond human reach, but in spite of this, it serves as a 
means of thinking critically and creatively about politics’.16 This makes the Political 
Treatise a very different kind of text from the Ethics, which does not invite critical 
examination of fictions, but draws us into the performance and affirmation of true 
ideas. The Ethics is written with the purpose of helping us to enhance the activity of 
thinking which is equivalent to true understanding (E IID3, IIP43S). The reader builds 
his or her true understanding through performing the activity of thought prompted by 
the words on the page. It is written in adequate demonstrations, according to the 
geometrical method, so the reader may unfold the truth in the best order.17 The Ethics 
is written and read according to the second type of knowledge, reason, whereas the 
Political Treatise is written and read according to the first type: imagination. Where 
the Political Treatise aims to engage us in a shared imagining of what the state can 
be, the Ethics aims to increase our knowledge and virtue. 
It would be inappropriate, then, to treat the Political Treatise as if it purported 
to offer true statements about women. It may well give us an accurate reflection of 
Spinoza’s beliefs about women, but Spinoza would be the first to insist that beliefs – 
even those that turn out to be true – are not true ideas as long as they are not truly 
understood (TIE 69). Spinoza does not truly understand why women are weaker and 
have less natural right than men; nor does he intimate that he does. However, Spinoza 
suggests that as no political discord has ever followed from this difference in power, it 
can continue to form part of the fictional democracy that states use as a model for 
seeking greater security and harmony. Gendered power difference is a poorly 
understood idea that forms part of a coherent fiction. That women are subject to 
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men’s power is a ‘part of nature’ that appears to pose no threat to the harmony of 
human communities: Spinoza sees no reason why this situation should be challenged 
in a model for stable democracy. 
 
 
Women, servants, children, and animals 
 
What true ideas can we draw from Spinoza’s philosophy concerning women’s 
capacity for political participation? It is the role of the Ethics, not the Political 
Treatise, to lead us to true understanding of human nature and human communities. If 
we want to understand the truth about women in Spinoza’s universe, we must turn to 
the Ethics.18 All hangs on whether women are ‘men’, and therefore ‘like us’, the term 
Spinoza uses for political co-participants in Ethics Part IV. If women are ‘men’, then 
the Ethics demonstrates that there are no essential reasons why women should not be 
rational and free, and therefore democratic participants. But as with nearly all 
Enlightenment thinkers, the question is precisely whether ‘men’ means human beings, 
or whether ‘men’ means men.  
Let’s take the case of a male servant as a point of comparison. In the Political 
Treatise Spinoza says that servants, too, are naturally disempowered because they are 
under the control of their masters.19 Spinoza defines freedom in terms of self-
determination. Servants are deprived of freedom in that they are constrained by 
another ‘to exist and to produce effects in a certain and determinate manner’ and are 
not ‘determined to act by themselves alone’ (E ID7). While the master-servant 
relation is, like the gendered power relation, found everywhere in human history, it is 
not embedded in the essential nature of the male servant, for whom greater self-
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determination is a fundamental capability. The servant can become more free by 
gaining greater power over his own acting and thinking, perhaps building reason and 
overcoming his affects by reading the Ethics. This may be possible only once he is 
released from servitude, or once employment legislation gives him more rights; the 
point is that what excludes the servant from freedom and citizenship is his existential 
situation in relation to other finite modes, not his essential nature. Because he is a 
‘man’, capable of building reason, the servant is essentially capable of becoming more 
free, in the sense of having greater power over his own acting and thinking. As long 
as he is a servant, he cannot be free enough to be a citizen, but when conditions allow 
it, he ceases to be a servant and becomes a free man. 
We might think that the same should be true for women: once they become 
more free, through a combination of rational self-improvement and societal change, 
they will have fulfilled the requirement for democratic participation that they be ‘in 
control of their own right’. However, women are different from male servants in that 
their bodies differ from men’s bodies. For Spinoza, the mind is the idea of the body 
and their activities are strictly parallel: mind and body are ‘one and the same thing, 
explained through different attributes’ (E IIP7S). Women’s minds must therefore 
differ from men’s to the same extent, and in the same ways, as their bodies differ.20 
Whereas the differences between masters and servants are largely social (or 
‘conventional’) for Spinoza, the differences between men and women are physical 
and mental.21 Unlike the male servant, who ceases to be a servant when he becomes a 
free man, a woman who becomes more free does not cease to be a woman. If 
women’s bodily constitution is fundamentally different from men’s, then women do 
not have the same bodily or mental capabilities as men. Note that for Spinoza – 
notwithstanding his imagining of women’s natural weakness – this means women 
 15
have different, not necessarily lesser, capabilities than men. Their power is different 
from men’s power; what they are able to do and think is different. If women’s 
essential power differs from men’s, then it must be that their virtue differs too (E 
IVD8). Since a being’s essence is its striving to preserve its being (E IIIP7), and since 
virtue is what is good for that striving (E IIIP9S), beings with different essences also 
have different virtues. As Spinoza says of men and horses: ‘the gladness of the one 
differs in nature from the gladness of the other as much as the essence of the one 
differs from the essence of the other’ (E IIIP57S). If there is a fundamental difference 
in essence between men and women, then we strive for different goods and become 
virtuous and free in different ways. A woman who increases her virtue and freedom 
becomes not the ‘free man’ of Ethics Parts IV and V, but a free woman. Are women’s 
capabilities, power, and essence so different from men’s that women could not 
become ‘free men’ and participate in democracy, even under optimal social 
circumstances? 
This seems to be what Spinoza affirms when he says that women and men do 
not possess equal ‘natural right’. In chapter 2 of the Political Treatise, Spinoza 
explains that ‘every natural thing has as much right from Nature as it has power to 
exist and to act. … The natural right of every individual is coextensive with its power’ 
(TP 2.3-4). The same definition of natural right is used in the Ethics, where Spinoza 
says it is our natural right to do what follows from the necessity of our nature (E 
IVP37S2). An individual has a natural right to do everything that it can do from the 
laws of its own nature; what it does from the laws of its own nature is necessarily 
good for it, and for the other individuals with which it shares the same nature (TP 2.4; 
E IVP35C2, IVP37). An individual’s natural right is determined by his or her bodily 
and mental capabilities, and ‘forbids nothing which is desired and possible’.22 Natural 
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right is, however, limited by the circumstances the individual finds itself in. In any 
given situation, an individual will not be able to do everything it can do. What it can 
do, bodily and mentally, is always determined by physical, environmental, social, and 
relational conditions. As Etienne Balibar puts it, ‘the individual’s right includes all 
that he is effectively able to do and to think in a given set of conditions’.23 We have 
the natural right to do only what we have the power to do, given the specific 
circumstances we are in. 
For Spinoza, no two individuals have exactly the same natural right, or power; 
indeed, no one individual has exactly the same natural right from moment to moment, 
given that conditions and capabilities are always changing. However, we can make 
general claims about the natural right, or power, of groups of individuals based on 
their shared bodily constitution: what a given kind of body is typically able to do. 
That means we can distinguish the natural right of human beings from the natural 
right of other animals. ‘Because the right of each one is defined by his virtue, or 
power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against 
men’ (E IVP37S1). Non-human animals lack the relevant capabilities to participate in 
the polity: their bodily differences mean animal and human essences, desires, and 
virtues are different, and they would not agree with us on common goods (E 
IVP37S1, IIIP57S). But it is not only animals that lack the relevant capabilities for 
political participation. Infants, generally dismissed by Spinoza as useless, have very 
limited power and natural right, and virtually no freedom. An infant may grow up to 
become a free man and a citizen, but there is no certainty about this transformation. A 
horse who became a free man could presumably also become a citizen: Spinoza 
suggests that it is only our experience that babies have become men, whereas horses 
have not, that makes this implausible, given that a baby differs from a free man as 
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much as a horse does (E IVP39S). As long as a child is a child – and as long as a 
horse is a horse – both are excluded from citizenship on the grounds of bodily and 
mental incapacity.   
The question is: are women more like servants, who are capable of building 
their power and thereby regaining their natural right to become citizens when social 
conditions allow it, or more like children and horses, who essentially lack the power 
and therefore the natural right to be citizens? If the former, then all that is required for 
women to become citizens is social change; if the latter, then women will not become 
citizens without undergoing a profound transformation of their nature. In the Political 
Treatise, Spinoza groups women, servants, and children together since none are in 
control of their own right. As Sacksteder points out, a person who is in another’s 
power is dependent on that other person’s rights: his own natural right and power will 
be diminished (124). But, as we have seen, there may be different reasons for the 
relative weakness of these individuals. An individual’s weakness may be explained by 
his essentially having lesser bodily and mental capabilities than others, or by the 
power-diminishing conditions of her existence.  
 
 
Others like us 
 
We need to ask whether Spinoza’s philosophy implies that women’s bodily and 
mental differences make them essentially incapable of political participation. To 
determine an individual’s essential capabilities and natural right, we must look at 
what their body is capable of doing, and what their mind is correspondingly capable 
of thinking. This varies between individuals, so no general statement about ‘men’ or 
 18
‘women’ will be accurate. Nevertheless, we can say that women’s bodily capabilities 
are different from men’s in some respects, and their desires and affects are different 
from men’s in some respects too.24 
When we seek our own advantage, we seek also the advantage of others like 
us (E IVP37). But who are these ‘others like us’? What appears to be a simple claim 
for the joint endeavours of human beings turns out to be more complicated. All finite 
modes are ‘like us’ in the sense that they are modes of substance in the attributes of 
extension and thought. All extended bodies form one body, and all the ideas, or 
minds, of those bodies form one idea: ‘the whole of nature is one individual, whose 
parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole 
individual’ (E IIP13L7). There is no finite mode with which we have nothing in 
common because ‘all bodies agree in certain things’ (E IIP13L2). However, bodies 
are distinguished from one another according to their rate of motion (E IIP13L1), and 
it is in terms of motion and rest that they find their similarities: bodies are like one 
another in what they are capable of doing. Other finite modes are ‘like us’ to varying 
extents, but they are more ‘like us’ as our bodies (and, in parallel, our minds) have 
common capabilities.25 I have most in common with other people whose bodily 
capabilities are most similar to my own, and progressively less in common with other 
humans, other mammals, other animals, and other things in nature as we share fewer 
and fewer capabilities. These circles of commonality indicate the different degrees of 
ethical and political relevance other beings have for us. Beings who are most ‘like us’ 
are most useful to us, and it is best for us that we preserve their being and promote 
their flourishing. As James argues, human freedom, social harmony and political 
stability are grounded in our becoming more alike, and in the overcoming, to some 
extent, of our individual differences.26 Importantly, our utility to one another depends 
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on similarity of bodily constitution – what the body does and how it moves – and not 
on similarities in appearance, background, ethnicity, or culture. 
If similarity of bodily constitution is what matters, perhaps women are more 
useful to women, and men are more useful to men, than either sex is to one another.27 
Indeed, a group of women might be of greater utility than a mixed-sex group in 
addressing problems, pursuing goods, and building knowledge specific to what 
women bodily have in common. But a human political community must address the 
problems and goods specific to human commonality, and women and men certainly 
have the bodily similarity to join together in this. Differences between the sexes are 
less significant than the bodily similarities that bind us together as members of the 
same species. ‘Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other 
individuals of the same species. And so nothing is more useful to man in preserving 
his being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is guided by reason’ (E 
IVApp.IX). The appeal to ‘individuals of the same species’ suggests that ‘man’ means 
a human being, not a specifically male one. Of course, ‘species’ here does not refer to 
scientific classification, and means something more like ‘kind’. Since men and 
women have bodies that are structurally very similar, and since their differences are 
complementary for the capability to reproduce, men and women must be individuals 
of the same kind, and useful to each other. Other humans are the beings most useful to 
us, particularly rational human beings, since people who are dominated by passions 
have diminished capabilities and are bound to differ (E IVP32). When we live 
according to the guidance of reason, we maximise our human capabilities and act 
according to the laws of a shared human nature. We have, as James puts it, achieved a 
degree of uniformity that enhances our power.28 ‘It follows that insofar as men live 
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according to the guidance of reason, they must do only those things which are good 
for human nature, and hence, for each man’ (E IVP35). 
However, being human is not sufficient for being ‘like us’. As we have seen, 
human babies are not ‘like us’, for their bodies are capable of only a very small 
proportion of what adult bodies are capable of, and they are wholly unable to live 
according to the guidance of reason. Nor is the drunk of E IIIP57S ‘like us’; 
determined almost entirely by passions, he strives for different goods and feels 
different affects. ‘There is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunk 
is led and the gladness a philosopher possesses’. Spinoza suggests here that the 
difference between the drunk and the philosopher is of the same order as the 
difference between a horse and a man. Indeed, we can imagine cases where a horse or 
a dog might be more ‘like us’ than another human: a farmer and a dog may share 
certain bodily capabilities by virtue of herding sheep together for years. There is a 
sense in which the farmer has more in common with his dog than he does with an 
infant, a drunk, or a person in a coma, none of whom are rational or useful to him. 
While animals may be useful to us, however, Spinoza is clear that we should not seek 
their company in preference to human society, for animals do not agree with our 
nature. If we attempt to form societies with individuals who do not agree with our 
nature, we will suffer a profound transformation due to our natural tendency to imitate 
the affects of those with whom we associate (E IIP27, IVApp.VII and XIII). It is best 
for humans to associate with other humans mutually to promote rationality. ‘Apart 
from men we know no singular thing in Nature whose mind we can enjoy, and which 
we can join to ourselves in friendship, or some kind of association’ (E IVApp.XXVI). 
Spinoza provides us with a fiction that supports this idea at E IVP68S. The 
fiction is that of ‘the first man’, Adam, who was supposedly born free, but began to 
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lose his freedom when he started to imitate the affects of the animals in paradise. 
IIIP27 tells us that ‘if we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, 
to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect’. The 
problem with Adam is that he imagines that the animals are ‘like him’, and he begins 
to feel the affects they feel (the basis of pity and emulation). Misled by his belief that 
he has found a being with common desires and goods, Adam emulates the snake’s 
desire for the fruit. His freedom, reason, and virtue diminish; he begins to fear death 
and to form concepts of good and evil. The cause of Adam’s downfall, in Spinoza’s 
strange retelling of this story, is an imagining that overpowers an important piece of 
true knowledge. Adam imagines that animals are like him. In truth, only one other 
individual is like him and capable of helping him build reason and freedom: his wife, 
Eve. 
Having found a wife who agreed completely with his nature, he knew 
that there could be nothing in Nature more useful to him than she was; 
but … after he believed the lower animals to be like himself, he 
immediately began to imitate their affects and to lose his freedom. (E 
IVP68S) 
As Gatens has remarked, Spinoza’s story of the fall is peculiar in attributing no 
responsibility to Eve.29 Perhaps Spinoza believes Eve was even more determined by 
imagination than Adam and had no freedom to lose. Yet Eve is said to agree 
completely with Adam’s nature and to be the most useful thing to him in nature, 
implying that she is a human being with the ability to reason. Adam neglects the 
community he has with Eve, the community which would have enabled both to build 
their rational knowledge and freedom. 
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According to this fiction, women and men agree completely in nature. We are 
so much alike, it seems, that nothing in nature can be more useful to us than a human 
being of the opposite sex. A man and a woman can form a community in which 
reason, virtue, and freedom are developed: the family. Spinoza upholds marriage 
between a man and a woman whose love is caused by ‘freedom of mind’ and 
maintained by the common love of ‘begetting children and educating them wisely’ (E 
IVApp.XX).30 This is a marriage not of passion, but of reason, where husband and 
wife feel a love arising from the individual freedom of each and relating to their 
common rational natures. In a rational relationship, the differences between the 
participants are overcome and their fundamental sameness highlighted.31 In such a 
marriage, a woman is as free and powerful as her husband, and both pursue 
understanding together. Such a woman would surely be capable of democratic 
participation too. But this model of marriage is an ideal, as impossible to achieve as 
the perfect human community. In a perfect community, where all members are fully 
rational, laws and constitutions are unnecessary because every individual always does 
what is best for all humanity. A real community, however, requires imaginary laws 
and structures to manage the passions of its members. And so a real marriage – if, for 
Spinoza as for other republican thinkers, the family is the microcosm of the state – 
requires imaginary rules and structures too. No marriage is perfectly rational, since no 
individual is free of passions. Every marriage involves love ‘which has a cause other 
than freedom of mind’, and this sensual love ‘easily passes into hate’. Furthermore, 
differing desires and feelings are a source of conflict. Real marriages involve 
vacillation between love and hate, and are ‘encouraged more by discord than by 
harmony’ (E IVApp.XIX).  
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Where people are at odds with each other, imaginary rules are required to 
manage their behaviour and bring about harmony. It is not that Spinoza advocates 
suppressing passions in marriage altogether, for this is neither possible nor 
desirable.32 Instead, it is a matter of managing affects through the use of stronger 
affects, usually fear (E IVP7). In the state, people refrain from harming others out of 
fear of the greater harm threatened by the sovereign power (E IVP37S2). Since 
marriages exist within states, their regulation is the responsibility of the state, at least 
in terms of legal restrictions on actions causing harm. Matheron argues that Spinoza 
sees states regulating the ‘ownership’ of women like that of land, ‘in order to 
attenuate [male] envy’.33 I think, with Richardson, that Matheron is mistaken to 
attribute to Spinoza a view of either persons or land as property. But furthermore, 
Matheron is wrong to suggest that marriages are governed primarily by states from 
the outside. For Spinoza, marriage itself is a political community with its own internal 
mechanism for managing the passions. Marriages are special micro-communities in 
which specific affects must constantly be managed: strong passions of love, hatred, 
lust, and jealousy must be restrained lest conflict arise. Specific rules are needed to 
maintain a peaceful and secure marriage in the face of these passions, and some 
‘sovereign power’ internal to the marriage must enforce them. The partners in a 
rational marriage will together decide and enforce rules based on their common 
natures. In a less rational marriage, the rules will be set by the more powerful partner. 
Marriage, like the state, distributes power in the way that most effectively manages 
affects within given circumstances, and a weaker person is less capable of managing 
affects (his own or someone else’s).  
It is not impossible, for Spinoza, that a wife should be the sovereign power in 
a marriage, and it is not impossible that husbands and wives should share power 
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equally. The worst marriages, like the worst states, will be tyrannical, and the best 
wholly democratic. Most marriages, however, fall between these two poles and will 
involve the unequal distribution of power in favour of the more powerful partner: the 
person who has the greater ability to persevere in his being. This does not relate only, 
or even primarily, to physical and mental ability. The partner with more power will be 
the person who is capable of doing and thinking more, but more importantly, it will be 
the person on whose power the other’s flourishing depends. Both partners must feel 
that their survival and happiness are threatened if they disobey the rules and threaten 
the harmony of the micro-community. In this situation, the more powerful partner will 
be the one who is not only stronger, better educated, and more active, but the one who 
could survive and flourish independently, without the other. That person is better able 
to preserve himself than the one who is dependent on him. In a society in which 
women are economically dependent on men, and could not easily flourish 
independently of them, women will necessarily be subject to the power of their 
husbands. Women, in these circumstances, are effectively prevented from striving for 
their own self-preservation except through submitting to the power of men.  
Perhaps Spinoza’s presentation of marriage as a political community, in which 
passions are managed through a social contract, strikes us as false. But it is hardly 
unusual for a seventeenth-century thinker to consider marriage the microcosm of the 
state; in focusing on this aspect of Spinoza’s account of marriage, we see that he takes 
women’s disempowerment to be caused by their economic position. Women are 
essentially capable of building reason and freedom, and of joining men in 
communities that strive for those goods. Women and men are alike and maximally 
useful to one another, especially when they are more rational, and can work together 
to build reason in the family. Why, then, should women not work with men to build 
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reason as democratic participants? Because women’s economic dependence causes 
them to be less free than they might otherwise become. Like servants, they rely on 
others for their survival and flourishing. In that position they cannot become free 
enough to be citizens. When social conditions change such that women need not be 
dependent on men in order to preserve their being, then women too can become ‘free 
men’. The key, for Spinoza as for Simone de Beauvoir, is economic independence.34  
Spinoza recognizes another crucial factor for women becoming more free. 
Men’s perceptions of women need to change, such that men see women not merely as 
women, but also as ‘free men’. 
If … we consider human emotions, that men generally love women 
from mere lust, assessing their ability and their wisdom by their beauty 
and also resenting any favours which the women they love show to 
others and so on, soon we shall see that rule by men and women on 
equal terms is bound to involve much damage to peace. But I have said 
enough. (TP 11.4) 
This statement, on which the Political Treatise ends, has been subject to much 
criticism for appearing to exclude women from politics on the grounds that men’s 
sexual desire for them would cause discord in the debating chamber. But read another 
way, Spinoza is decrying men whose passions obstruct a rational assessment of 
women’s abilities and wisdom, and prevent them working together to build rational 
communities. Like Adam, their imaginings lead them to ignore the individuals with 
whom they have most in common. As long as men continue to be blinded by lust and 
jealousy, political cooperation between men and women will indeed lead to conflict. 
 The solution, as ever for Spinoza, is to help men to overcome their passions. 
As they become more rational, men will be less blinded by these passions and 
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understand that a rational woman is as useful as a rational man. Reason alone, 
however, will not be enough to change the socio-economic circumstances that make 
women dependent on their husbands, and Spinoza, unlike other Enlightenment 
thinkers, truly understands this. Reason is not always strong enough to overcome the 
practices we are accustomed to or the deeply ingrained fictions of the imagination. 
And Spinoza is no less susceptible to these fictions than anyone else of his society. He 
understands that under different circumstances, different capabilities may emerge for 
different individuals. Where Spinoza fails is that he cannot see a way of changing 
these circumstances in order to maximize the capabilities of the disempowered half of 
humanity. As James points out, this is literally a failure of imagination: a failure to 
foresee the social changes that are necessary for women to be free.35 But a failure of 
imagination is preferable to a failure of reason. Spinoza does not argue that women 
are essentially weak or absolutely subject to men’s control. His problem is that, in 
pointing to the social reality of women’s weakness, he cannot imagine acting to 
change it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
With the words ‘But I have said enough’, the Political Treatise was left unfinished in 
1677. Though it is often taken as Spinoza’s final word on politics, we must be wary of 
assuming that any unfinished text fully expresses its author’s intentions. Instead of 
taking Spinoza’s claims at face value, we can, and I think should, address the 
unresolved problems of the Political Treatise through Spinoza’s major work, the 
Ethics. Furthermore, the Ethics must shed light on the Political Treatise, and not the 
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other way around, because the texts differ in their relation to truth. Whereas the Ethics 
is written as an exercise in performing and building true understanding, the Political 
Treatise sets out and shares with us fictions that are neither true nor false, but 
hypothetical. Spinoza’s societal models are held out for critical scrutiny and 
judgment, and the tools with which we must exercise critique are the true ideas and 
rational thinking that we have built up by reading the Ethics. If, therefore, we want to 
think critically about the place of women in Spinoza’s democracy, we must use the 
Ethics to find true ideas that can help us to do so. It would be wrong, on Spinoza’s 
terms, to take as true what he expresses about women in the Political Treatise, or to 
accept those remarks uncritically. 
 The Ethics shows us that women and men are alike capable of building reason 
and freedom, and are capable of building rational communities together. It also shows 
that, under social and economic conditions that favour men’s seeking their advantage 
and preserving their being, these communities will necessarily be constrained by 
unequal power relations. The primary communities between men and women, 
marriages, will be dominated by husbands as long as wives depend on them for their 
self-preservation. A more rational marriage, in which the passions are largely 
overcome, involves more natural cooperation and mutual freedom, but even women in 
these marriages will be excluded from political participation as long as they are 
economically dependent and their natural right to preserve their being depends on the 
power of another. It is in this context that we must interpret the remarks of the 
Political Treatise that women are ‘naturally weak’. Women, for Spinoza, are 
disempowered by ‘the order of nature’ – the way the actual world is organized – not 
by their own essential natures. It is not women’s bodies or minds but their 
circumstances that render them incapable of political participation.  
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 I arrive at a similar conclusion to Lloyd: in Spinoza we find a strand of 
thinking that recognizes women’s political capabilities while acknowledging that they 
are constrained by social and historical circumstances.36 However, I arrive at that 
conclusion by a different route, which is valuable in helping us to assess the relative 
value of Spinoza’s claims in his different texts. We need not be troubled by Spinoza’s 
claims about women in the Political Treatise if we understand them through the true 
ideas of the Ethics. It is not that we should not take the claims of the Political Treatise 
seriously, but we must take them seriously in the right way: not as assertions of truth, 
but as hypotheses for rational critical consideration. Through the sharing of fictions, 
the Political Treatise poses challenges to readers, to imagine different political futures 
together. According to that text, the disempowerment of women is ‘part of nature’. 
Spinoza does not seek to justify or condemn that fact, but he does seek to explain it. 
And having explained it in the Ethics – as a socio-economic reality rather than an 
eternal necessity – he enables us critically to consider the model of stable democracy 
provided in the Political Treatise. A stable and harmonious democracy can exist, 
Spinoza says, in which half its people are subject to the power of others. Can we, 
together, imagine a democracy that is also more equal?37 
 
- Beth Lord is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Dundee. 
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